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WHAT TWOMBLY AND MEAD HAVE IN COMMON 
Amy J. Wildermuth 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 
has already had enormous implications for pleading requirements under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As of early April 2008—less than a year 
after it was issued—Twombly had been cited in almost 5,000 cases.2  It also 
was an immediate—and continuing—source of much academic debate.3 
I cannot help but notice a distinct parallel between Twombly and 
another opinion authored by Justice Souter, United States v. Mead.4  At first 
blush, these cases have little in common outside of their author: One was an 
antitrust dispute about what factual evidence must exist and be pled to de-
feat a Rule 12 motion on an alleged ―parallel conduct‖ violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act; the other was an administrative law case about the 
deference owed to agencies‘ statutory interpretations that are not subjected 
to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) required process.  What brings this 
odd couple together? 
The most obvious shared trait is that the Court appears to have funda-
mentally altered procedural law in both decisions.  That alone, however, 
does not mean much.  Changing the law, even significantly, is the Court‘s 
prerogative.  The common denominator instead is the confusion one is left 
with after parsing both Twombly and Mead.  It is one thing to know that the 
law has changed when the change—the new order, the new rule, the new 
way of operating—is clear.  But these opinions offer no straightforward an-





  Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. 
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  127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (link). 
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  As of April 6, 2008, Westlaw‘s KeyCite service listed 4,910 cases that cite Twombly. 
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  See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117 (2007), 
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la of circular directions: it begins with a fairly clear description of the gen-
eral legal test to apply, but then proceeds to detail exceptions or additions 
that have the potential to swallow the general rule. 
These two cases are different, however, in one important way: the 
Court‘s ability to correct the confusion its decisions engender.  Even if the 
Court were interested in revisiting the question of the proper deference to 
afford agency interpretations, it would need to wait for a good vehicle to 
address the many uncertainties Mead has generated.  The confusion with re-
spect to Twombly, however, can disappear quickly.  Acting under its powers 
to revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court could revise either 
Rule 85 or Rule 96 and thus immediately end the speculation regarding what 
Twombly means. 
I. THE CONFUSION WROUGHT BY TWOMBLY AND MEAD 
Mead, the elder of this pair by about five years, involved the deference, 
if any, to be given to U.S. Customs Service‘s interpretation of the statute it 
administered, the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.7  The 
specific question before the Court was whether the agency‘s interpretation 
should be afforded Chevron deference, no deference, or some other kind of 
deference.  The Court concluded that, where a statute is ambiguous, agency 
interpretations that carry the ―force of law‖ qualify for Chevron deference, 
while agency interpretations lacking the ―force of law‖ should be evaluated 
under Skidmore‘s rubric to determine what amount of deference they will 
receive.  Chevron deference is relatively clear—courts must defer to agency 
interpretations that are reasonable.  In contrast, Skidmore employs an inhe-
rently malleable sliding scale of deference—from no deference to great de-
ference—that evaluates the interpretation‘s weight based on ―the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.‖8 
The murkiness created by Mead plays out on two fronts: First, what in-
terpretations have the ―force of law‖?  Second, given its sliding scale, when 





  FED. R. CIV P. 8(a) provides that a claim must contain a jurisdictional statement, a demand for re-
lief, and ―a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖ 
6
  FED. R. CIV. P. 9 provides rules for pleading special matters including: 
(b) . . . In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person‘s mind may be 
alleged generally. 
. . .  
(g) . . . If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated. 
7
  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221–22 (discussing the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 
19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000)). 
8
  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (link). 
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ceive?  Mead left lower courts painfully confused on both questions.9  Even 
worse, because the analysis required by Mead is so complicated and un-
clear, courts often do not engage it fully but instead collapse it into some-
thing much simpler,10 thus making it more prone to results-oriented 
manipulation.11 
In addition to these overarching problems, the Court‘s analysis in 
Mead of what agency interpretations carry the force of law is particularly 
bewildering.  It began by explaining that most of the time, the ―fruits of no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication,‖ that is, those inter-
pretations that are the result of APA-required process, qualify.12  If 
Congress, however, makes clear that it did not intend for certain interpreta-
tions to have the force of law adopted even when using these procedures, 
they will not.  So far, all is clear. 
But then the Court seems to circle back on itself: it is possible that an 
interpretation adopted not using APA-required procedures may carry the 
force of law and thus receive Chevron deference.  In support of this propo-
sition, the Court offered a single example, NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Va-
riable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,13 in which the Court held that the Comptroller 
of the Currency‘s interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the National 
Bank Act detailed in a letter were entitled to Chevron deference.14  The 
Court also provided additional factors that courts might consider when de-
termining whether an interpretation has the force of law, including (1) 
whether the statute requires relatively formal procedures, (2) whether the 
agency may adopt rules that can be generalized to more than one case, and 
(3) whether like cases are required to be treated alike.15  These factors do 





  See Amy J. Wildermuth, Bringing Order to the Skidmore Revival: A Response to Hickman and 
Krueger, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR, 
http://www.clrsidebar.org/replies/wildermuth_bringing_order_to_the_skidmore_revival (Dec. 16, 2007) 
(link) [hereinafter Wildermuth, Bringing Order]; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search 
of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1291 (2007) (link) (―It is apparent that 
the courts of appeals lack a coherent conception of how Skidmore‘s sliding scale should function.‖); 
Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1890–99 (2006) (link) [hereinafter Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle].  
10
  See Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle, supra note 9, at 1892–96 (describing the shortcutting with 
respect to whether Chevron or Skidmore applies); id. at 1897–98 (describing shortcutting with respect to 
the amount of deference afforded when Skidmore applies). 
11
  Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 820 (2004) (link) (―Rules are generally more predictable and easier 
to enforce than standards.  Hence, they generally are a superior mechanism for controlling the behavior 
of subordinate actors within a hierarchy.‖); Wildermuth, Bringing Order, supra note 9 (―[T]he less 
straightforward the test, the easier it becomes to hide what is really going on.‖). 
12
  Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
13
  513 U.S. 251 (1995) (link). 
14
  Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31, 231 n.13 (citing Nations Bank of N.C., N.A., 513 U.S. at 256–57, 
263). 
15
  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–34; Merrill, supra note 11, at 814. 
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nor any particular combination of them, appears to be determinative.16  With 
so little guidance, it is easy to imagine any number of agency actions poten-
tially falling into this category and thus having the force of law, leading one 
to wonder why the Court bothered with a test for force of law at all. 
The Court‘s lack of clarity on this issue has led commentators to pro-
pose a variety of solutions for determining what agency actions have the 
force of law.17  Despite their differences, one theme predominates through-
out the proposals: the need for a much clearer rule from the Court.18  
Twombly‘s murkiness, at least with respect to pleading requirements, 
bears an eerie resemblance to that of Mead‘s handling of the force of law 
question.  Twombly involved a class action claim that certain telephone 
companies, the Baby Bells, had conspired to restrain trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.19  The plaintiffs based their claim on the de-
fendants‘ parallel business conduct—in plain English, substantially similar 
behavior—that allegedly demonstrated an agreement to reduce competition.  
The central issue in the case was whether these allegations of parallel beha-
vior plus a conclusory, ―bare assertion‖20 of conspiracy was sufficient to 
state a Section 1 claim.  Largely driven by concerns over the perceived ease 
with which plaintiffs may assert such a claim, the Court concluded that Sec-
tion 1 plaintiffs must demonstrate that the asserted conspiracy is ―plausi-
ble.‖21  That is, a plaintiff must provide in its complaint ―enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.‖22 
Others have debated, and will continue to debate, whether this is the 
correct rule as a matter of antitrust law, for the incentives it creates and be-
havior it inspires.23  The bigger procedural question, however, is whether 
the Court‘s requirement to plead particular facts alters the well-known Rule 
8 notice pleading standards outside of antitrust law.  Here is where, as with 





  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 n.18; see also Merrill, supra note 11, at 813–14 (discussing the major-
ity opinion in Mead as having ―declined to identify any of these factors as being either necessary or suf-
ficient conditions for finding the relevant type of delegation‖). 
17
  See, e.g., Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle, supra note 9, at 1900–04 (detailing several of the po-
tential solutions). 
18
  See Merrill, supra note 11, at 833 (―The Court‘s decision to treat ‗force of law‘ as a standard ra-
ther than a rule is regrettable.‖). 
19
  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1961–63 (2007) (link) (discussing the plain-
tiffs‘ claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. 2004)) (link).  
20
  Id. at 1966. 
21
  Id. at 1965. 
22
  Id. 
23
  See, e.g., Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Pleading Private Antitrust Con-
spiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013574 (link). 
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The opinion begins by tying its analysis to traditional notice pleading 
standards.24  It then shifts to a more narrow discussion of plausibility and 
the importance of such a requirement in antitrust cases in which discovery 
is expensive.25  Next, it returns to the issue of general notice pleading and 
discusses how puzzled the profession has been by Conley v. Gibson‘s fifty-
year-old test for all Rule 12(b)(6) motions:26 ―a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would en-
title him to relief.‖27  The Court then retires the ―no set of facts‖ language.28  
Finally, at the end of the opinion, the Court circles back to the more narrow 
ground for its decision, insisting that notice pleading has not been aban-
doned, that it is not impermissibly creating ―heightened fact pleading of 
specifics,‖ and repeating again that this case is simply about requiring plau-
sibility.29 
Once the spinning sensation stops, much like Mead, we are left to 
wonder: Are we to adhere to the general rule of notice pleading but under-
stand that Twombly requires an additional pleading requirement for a very 
specific type of antitrust claim?  Or is the additional discussion of discovery 
costs and Conley meant to swallow the old notice pleading rule and replace 
it with a new kind of pleading system that requires pleaders to demonstrate 
plausibility, a ―notice-plus‖ system, as Professor Scott Dodson has labeled 
it?30 
Those who attempt to limit Twombly to the antitrust context typically 
describe the Court‘s new requirement as an additional element to be pled.31  
This makes sense because it has long been understood that Rule 8 requires 
pleadings to contain allegations in support of each material element of a 
claim.  If plausibility was a new element of an antitrust claim, it would be 
fair to ask for an allegation to support it.  The problem with this spin on 
Twombly, however, is that Twombly did not add any elements to Section 1 
claims.  To bring a Section 1 case before Twombly, the plaintiff had to 
prove an agreement; that is still required.  Twombly simply calls for more to 
be alleged up front that will show the existence of an agreement.  Accor-





  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65 (2007) (link).   
25
  Id. at 1966–67. 
26
  Id.  at 1968–69. 
27
  Id. at 1968 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
28
  Id. at 1968–69. 
29
  Id. at 1973–74 & n.14. 
30
  Dodson, supra note 3, at 138. 
31
  Bradley, supra note 3, at 122 (―‗Plausibility‘ is an element of a certain kind of antitrust conspira-
cy claim, not a standard for pleadings in general.‖). 
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quired beyond Rule 8 unless it is found in Rule 9 or a specific statute,32 this 
interpretation yields a judicially created special pleading rule for Section 1 
claims based on parallel conduct. 
On the flip side, although a new interpretation of Rule 8 for all cases is 
more consistent with the Court‘s statements against judicially created spe-
cial exceptions, it is hard to imagine that the Court intended such wholesale 
change.  Pronouncing that ―notice pleading is dead for all cases and causes 
of action‖33 seems extreme, particularly given the opinion‘s plain statements 
that the majority intended nothing of the sort.  This view is even harder to 
square with the Court‘s decision—less than a month after Twombly was de-
cided—in Erickson v. Pardus,34 a summary reversal that cited Twombly for 
the proposition that specific facts need not be pled: ―the statement need on-
ly ‗give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.‖35 
Between these two extremes, there exists at least some middle ground.  
It may be that the Court intended to reinterpret Rule 8 to require a notice-
plus system for certain kinds of cases.  Drawing on the example of this par-
ticular antitrust claim, it could be that the Court wants more when it comes 
to cases in which the discovery is costly.36  But this option, too, leaves us 
guessing because the opinion does not provide any guidance as to what 
might be costly enough to trigger Twombly‘s heightened requirements.  
Moreover, the text of Rule 8 says nothing about this kind of requirement. 
Most importantly, without clear guidance from the Court as to which 
of these is the correct reading, results-oriented manipulation could rear its 
head here too.  That is, it may be that courts will dismiss certain types of 
suits or suits brought by certain kinds of plaintiffs on the ground that they 
were not pled correctly. 
II. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Our odd couple‘s mutual murkiness leaves lower courts and practition-
ers in quite a lurch.  One possibility is for the Court to take a case that raises 






  See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–14 (2002) (link); Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics, Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (link); cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2507–08 (2007) (link). 
33
  Dodson, supra note 3, at 138. 
34
  127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (link). 
35
  Id. at 2200 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)). 
36
  Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (―[I]t is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level 
suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases 
with no ‗reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence‘ to support 
a § 1 claim.‖ (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). 
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With respect to Mead, although many have suggested that the Court 
ought to clarify its ruling, in the several years since that decision, the Court 
has provided little help regarding the appropriate level of Skidmore defe-
rence to be afforded.37  It has addressed Mead‘s force of law test in two opi-
nions but those appear to have been a step away from and then back to 
Mead.  In 2002, Barnhart v. Walton38 articulated an entirely new set of cri-
teria for deciding what was to get Chevron deference, contributing even 
more confusion to the issue.39  Last year, however, Long Island Care at 
Home, Ltd. v. Coke40 appeared to signal a return to the Mead criteria by cit-
ing Mead and emphasizing the binding nature of the regulation at issue.41  
The Court did not, however, attempt to further explain Mead‘s force of law 
test, thus returning us exactly where Mead left us in 2001. Finally, because 
Mead has not one but two areas of confusion, finding a single case that 
would allow the Court to address both is more challenging.42 
With respect to Twombly, however, the Court could end the current 
confusion quickly without waiting for the right case to come along.  Under 
the Rules Enabling Act,43 the Court could revise Rule 9 to reflect a heigh-
tened pleading standard for certain antitrust cases, or it could revise Rule 8 
to embody new pleading, notice-plus requirements.44  Although it is not 
common for the Court to draft rules itself,45 it has the power to do so.  If the 
Court were to select this route, the revised rule must be promulgated by 
May 1st and would take effect on December 1st if Congress does not act to 





  See, e.g., Alaska Dep‘t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487–88, 494 (2004) (link) 
(applying some Skidmore factors but then using the language of Chevron to explain the agency‘s inter-
pretation as a reasonable and permissible one); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 
440, 448–49 & n.9 (2003) (link) (Skidmore analysis consisted of noting that agency interpretation was 
―not controlling—even though it may ‗constitute a body of experience and informed judgment‘ to which 
we may resort for guidance.‖ (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
38
  535 U.S. 212 (2002) (link). 
39
  Id. at 222 (listing four new factors for determining whether Chevron or Skidmore applied: ―the in-
terstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question 
to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of time‖). 
40
  127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007) (link). 
41
  Id. at 2350–51.  It is worth noting that Justice Breyer authored both Barnhart and Long Island. 
42
  But not impossible: a case involving the circuit split over RESPA §8(b) may provide the Court 
with a good vehicle to revisit both issues. See Jonathan P. Solomon, Note, Resolving RESPA’s § 8(b) 
Circuit Split, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1496–98 (2006) (link).    
43
  28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2000) (link). 
44
  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (link). 
45
  Revision to the rules of civil procedure typically would begin in the Advisory Committee on 
Rules of Civil Procedure, then go through the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (also 
known as the Standing Committee), and then to the Judicial Conference.  See The Rulemaking Process: 
A Summary for the Bench and Bar (Oct. 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (link). 
46
  28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2000) (link). 
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Revising Rule 9 would seem to be the preferred route if Twombly was 
intended to have only narrow application to certain antitrust claims.  The 
Court, however, explained that Rule 9 was not appropriate because ―our 
concern is not that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently ‗par-
ticular[ized]‘, [Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)–(c)]; rather, the complaint warranted 
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs‘ entitlement to relief 
plausible.‖47 
The distinction that the Court draws here is confusing, to say the least, 
when it is understood that ―particularized‖ in this context means that a 
plaintiff must allege additional information regarding the fraud or mistake 
that is claimed.  The usual reason provided for requiring particularized 
pleading under Rule 9(b) is to prevent groundless claims that are perceived 
as more costly.48  As such, the requirements of Rule 9(b) and the justifica-
tion for them sound an awful lot like what was said in Twombly. 
But the Court need not agree that its ruling requires particularity to add 
its Twombly requirement to Rule 9.  Rule 9 contains the rules or require-
ments for the pleading of any special matter, not just those that must be pled 
with specificity or particularity.  Accordingly, to clear up Twombly‘s confu-
sion, the Court could simply add a new subsection to Rule 9—say, subsec-
tion (i), ―Sherman Act Section 1 Parallel Conduct Matters.‖  Such a 
provision could be straightforward: ―When claiming a violation of Sherman 
Act Section 1 based on parallel business conduct, a plaintiff must provide 
sufficient facts to suggest an agreement between defendants.‖ 
If, on the other hand, the Court intended to revise the pleading system 
in a more fundamental way, it might consider revising Rule 8.  Specifically, 
the Court could amend Rule 8(a)(2) to require ―a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that it is plausible that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖  
Or, if it does not intend this broad of a revision, it could modify Rule 
8(a)(2) to require ―a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief, and must demonstrate that such relief is plausi-
ble in those cases in which discovery is particularly costly.‖  These revi-
sions lack the immediate clarity of a revision to Rule 9—what is necessary 
to show plausibility? and when is discovery particularly costly?—but would 
make clear the Court‘s intentions. 
CONCLUSION 
In fairness, what I have described as the murkiness of Mead and 





  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973 n.14 (2007) (link). 
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  5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1296, 37–38 (3d ed. 2004) (―[S]ome federal courts have expressed the view that allegations of fraud or 
mistake frequently are advanced only for their nuisance or settlement value and with little hope that they 
will be successful on the merits. . . .  [F]ederal courts have [also] pointed out that the greater pleading 
specificity required by Rule 9(b) deters the filing of suits solely for discovery purposes.‖). 
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analysis that, over time, may be shaped and adjusted to become more work-
able.  My preference to draw clear lines might be faulted for lacking the 
flexibility that permits the law to develop, to allow it to percolate and be 
worked out over time.  But I am not alone in my frustration when it comes 
to figuring out how to apply these tests now, as the uncertainty among prac-
titioners and the academy already shows.  Moreover, the particular murki-
ness here does not involve substantive law, which may well benefit from 
more nuanced analyses, but rather procedural law, which we typically pre-
fer to embody in clear rules and statutes. 
So is there any resolution in sight?  Although it has no reason to pay 
me any attention, I have a deal for the Court: let‘s split the difference.  I will 
be more patient with the Court‘s taking its time to revisit Mead.  I will con-
tinue to evaluate its repercussions critically but will be more attentive to the 
positive developments that may result from the percolation.  With respect to 
Twombly, however, consider revising the rules immediately to clarify what 
Twombly means.  The more fitting and more narrow revision would seem to 
be a revision to Rule 9, but a revision to either Rule 8 or 9 along the lines 
described above would largely resolve the confusion left in Twombly‘s 
wake—a confusion, I note, with a much larger numerical impact than that 
of Mead.49 





  Compare supra note 2, (almost 5,000 citations to Twombly less than a year after the decision) 
with Hickman & Krueger, supra note 9, at 1259–61 (noting that there were only ―450 federal appellate 
court opinions that cited Skidmore, Christensen, or Mead‖ in the five years after Mead was decided). 
